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ELD-031 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-9002
___________
IN RE:  JEFFREY A. BEARD; DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; 
AND FRANKLIN J. TENNIS,
Petitioners
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to E.D. Pa. No. 05-cv-1094)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
May 25, 2010
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  June 3, 2010)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania petitions for a writ of mandamus to challenge
a discovery order issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in a capital habeas corpus matter.  For the following reasons, we will deny
the petition.
      Uderra also requested materials concerning witness reimbursement for hotels and1
meals, but subsequently withdrew the request.
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I.  Background
In 1993, after a jury trial, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
convicted Jose Uderra of first degree murder and other crimes.  He was sentenced to
death.  In 2005, through counsel, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  He raised numerous claims, including ineffective assistance of
counsel and race discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
On October 1, 2007, Uderra filed a motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 6 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.  Uderra sought: (1) copies of the discovery
materials that previously had been provided to Uderra’s trial counsel; (2) copies of or
access to the original police files maintained in the City of Philadelphia Archives;
(3) copies of the prosecutor’s notes on jury selection, the juror questionnaires from
Uderra’s trial, and general materials on jury selection procedures; and (4) all exculpatory
material.   Uderra argued he had good cause for each request.1
The Commonwealth responded to the discovery motion.  The Commonwealth
agreed to provide fresh copies of the pretrial discovery that had been provided to Uderra
in the state court proceedings, as well as any exculpatory evidence it had an obligation to
disclose.  However, the Commonwealth opposed the discovery requests made in support
3of Uderra’s Batson claim – specifically, the prosecutor’s notes, the jury questionnaires,
and the materials on jury selection procedures – arguing that the underlying Batson claim
clearly lacked merit.  The Commonwealth also opposed Uderra’s request for access to the
complete police file, on the grounds that the material was protected by privilege and that
Uderra was merely attempting to conduct a “fishing expedition” to search for potential
new habeas corpus claims.
On February 9, 2009, the District Court granted the discovery request in part, by
ordering the Commonwealth to produce the materials related to Uderra’s Batson claim. 
In a footnote, the District Court stated, apparently erroneously, that the Commonwealth
had voluntarily agreed to turn over the other requested materials, including the complete
archived police file.
The Commonwealth moved for reconsideration, arguing that recent authority
clearly bars Uderra’s underlying Batson claim, see Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272 (3d
Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Beard v. Abu-Jamal, 130 S. Ct. 1134
(2010), and therefore precludes the finding of good cause for discovery on that claim. 
Uderra responded that discovery was appropriate both to preserve the claim in the event
of a change in the law and because he wished to pursue a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for neglecting to pursue and preserve his Batson claim at trial.
On January 25, 2010, the District Court heard argument on the motion and, on
March 15, 2010, the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration.  Among other
      The Commonwealth argues that the provision limiting the availability of an2
evidentiary hearing in habeas corpus cases where a state prisoner fails to first develop the
factual basis of a claim in state court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), similarly circumscribes
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things, the District Court accepted Uderra’s argument that he has good cause to pursue
discovery in support of a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Batson
claim at trial.  In addition to the previously-ordered discovery, the District Court ordered
the Commonwealth to produce the complete archived police file.
The Commonwealth filed this petition for a writ of mandamus on April 15, 2010.
II.  Analysis
A.
A habeas petitioner, unlike an ordinary civil litigant in federal court, is not
automatically entitled to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Bracy v.
Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997).  Under Rule 6 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,
a party seeking discovery must make specific requests and must provide reasons for the
requests.  See Rule 6(b).  Upon such a motion, the District Court “may, for good cause,
authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
may limit the extent of discovery.”  Rule 6(a).  The United States Supreme Court has held
that a District Court has a duty to permit Rule 6 discovery in a habeas corpus matter
“where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner
may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to
relief. . . .”   Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09. 2
the availability of document discovery.  We have not previously addressed this issue and,
given our disposition of this petition, need not do so in this case.
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The thrust of the Commonwealth’s petition focuses on the contention that Uderra’s
underlying Batson claim lacks merit, thereby precluding a finding of good cause to
support discovery on that claim.  Before we may consider the Commonwealth’s claim,
however, we must address a determinative threshold issue:  whether, under the
circumstances of this case, our mandamus jurisdiction permits us to immediately review
the District Court’s discovery order.
B.
We have authority to issue a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act.  28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a); see In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 1998).  Mandamus is
a drastic remedy granted only in the most extraordinary situations.  Hahnemann Univ.
Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996).  Before we may exercise our discretion
to issue the writ, the petitioner must establish both a “clear and indisputable” right to
relief and that there is “no other adequate means” to obtain relief.  See In re Diet Drugs
Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378-79 (3d Cir. 2005).  The writ does not provide a
substitute for an appeal.  See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004). 
As a general rule, the normal appeal process provides the opportunity to obtain
relief from a District Court’s pretrial discovery order.  Accordingly, civil litigants must
wait until after final judgment to vindicate their rights relative to such orders.  See 28
6U.S.C. § 1291; Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606 (2009).  Indeed, if
we were to routinely issue the writ of mandamus to review discovery orders, we would be
encouraging the sort of piecemeal litigation we have been specifically instructed to
discourage.  See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976). 
Under appropriate circumstances, however, we may exercise our discretion to
issue a writ of mandamus to promptly correct the most serious and fundamental District
Court errors concerning pretrial discovery matters.  See Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 608.  For
instance, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that mandamus may be
appropriate where a pretrial discovery order reflects a judicial usurpation of power or a
clear abuse of discretion, or where necessary to remedy a manifest injustice.  Id. at 607. 
Here, the Commonwealth’s basic contention is that the District Court committed
legal error in determining whether good cause supports the discovery requests in the
underlying habeas corpus matter.  See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09.  A claim of legal error
in a discovery decision generally does not fall within our mandamus authority.  The
Commonwealth has not, for example, set forth a claim that the District Court acted
entirely without jurisdiction.  See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.3d 1310, 1314 (3d Cir.
2000) (“Courts traditionally have employed writs to restrain jurisdictional excesses,
particularly when a lower court has acted without authority to do so.”); see also In re
Pruett, 133 F.3d 275, 280 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Because the issue involves the court’s
      To the extent the Commonwealth attempts to rely upon decisions by the Court of3
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that Court applies a balancing test in which clear legal
error may provide the sole basis for issuing the writ of mandamus.  See Calderon v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. Cal., 98 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1996).  We have not adopted the
Ninth Circuit’s approach.
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authority to act ex parte at all and not whether discretion was or was not properly
exercised, we believe mandamus is the only ‘adequate’ means of testing the issue.”).
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth proposes that mandamus should lie to
immediately consider its claim, arguing that we have expressed a preference for granting
the writ to permit immediate review of discovery orders in habeas corpus matters. 
(Petition at 5, n.4.)  However, the Commonwealth provides no support for its proposal
that the habeas corpus discovery context alone establishes a basis for granting mandamus
relief.   To the contrary, we do not apply such “black letter” rules to mandamus3
determinations.  See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 772-73.
Next, the Commonwealth asserts we should grant mandamus because this habeas
corpus discovery order implicates decisions made by state courts.  The United States
Supreme Court has “long recognized the principles of federalism and comity at stake
when state prisoners attempt to use the federal court to attack their final convictions.” 
Dist. Att’y’s Office of 3d Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2324 (2009) (Alito,
J., concurring) (citations omitted).  However, we cannot conclude that the mere existence
of these interests requires our immediate intervention in the District Court proceeding. 
We may review the habeas corpus discovery order, and address any comity, federalism, or
      The Commonwealth argues that “routine defense access to full police files is4
eventually going to get someone threatened, hurt or even killed.”  (Petition at 4.)  While
protecting individual safety is indeed important, the Commonwealth has offered nothing
more than a broad generalization and has not identified a concern specific to the
underlying proceeding.  Moreover, the District Court is equipped to fashion a variety of
remedies to address particular safety and confidentiality concerns.  We note that the
Commonwealth has never requested any of them.
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other important interests it may implicate, during the course of an ordinary appeal when
the District Court has entered a final judgment.  The Commonwealth has not established
otherwise.
Finally, the Commonwealth contends the District Court’s order infringes upon its
general interest in protecting police files from public disclosure.  Mandamus may be
appropriate in cases in which a party has been ordered to produce documents entitled to
protection based upon a recognized privilege or confidentiality interest.  See Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir. 1994); Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1984).  Here, however, the Commonwealth’s
broad invocation of a general confidentiality interest is insufficient.  To warrant
mandamus, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that compliance with the District
Court’s order will destroy the specific interest that requires protection in this case.   See4
In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d at 227 n.9; Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 591.  The
Commonwealth has not met that burden.
9C.
In sum, the Commonwealth contends the District Court improperly granted
Uderra’s habeas corpus discovery requests.  Because the Commonwealth’s claims may be
addressed in the course of an ordinary appeal, the Commonwealth has not established that
there is “no other adequate means” by which it may obtain relief from the District Court’s
habeas corpus discovery order.  See Kerr, 426 U.S. at 404-05.  The Commonwealth
therefore has failed to make the necessary showing to warrant mandamus relief. 
III.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
